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MIDGETT v. STATE

offices made ineligible by state law to hold public office
during their term."8
If the states were allowed to add to or vary the qualifications of Representatives in Congress, they would, in
essence, be determining the prerequisites for federal office.
Logically, states may make rules and determine qualifications for their own officers, but it has been held that a
Representative is an officer of the Federal government and
not of his state.1" Aside from the oath to support the Constitution which is taken by all members 20 and the power of
each House to determine the qualifications of its members,2
there appears to be nothing more specific which would
preclude a member of Congress from being a person whose
ideas are adverse to basic American precepts, yet one who
still upholds the Constitution in his own manner. If that
is to be a disqualification of a Representative it must be
determined by Congress, or by constitutional amendment,
and not by a state legislature or a state court.2 2
SANFORD A. MESKIN*

Presence Of Accused At Trial NecessaryKidnapping And False Imprisonment Differentiated
Midgett v. State'
On January 16, 1957, the defendant and two others
while parked behind the main office of a Baltimore restaurant, which they intended to rob, were surprised by a police
patrol car. While the officer was inquiring as to the defendant's business in the alley, one of the defendant's companions drew a pistol and forced the officer to hand over his
service revolver, belt, holster and flashlight. The officer was
then placed in the defendant's car, driven ten miles out
of the city and left tied to a tree. All of the officer's equip'8Ekwall v. Stadelman, 146 Or. 439, 30 P. 2d 1037 (1,34) : State v.
Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W. 2d 504 (1946).
iDLamar v. U.S., 241 U.S. 103 (1916).
'*U.S. CONST. Art. 6, Cl. 3.
2U.S. CONST. Art. 1, §5, Ci. 1.
1Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 196, 76 A. 2d 332 (1950).
* A student at Seton Hall School of Law.
1216 Md. 26, 139 A. 2d 209 (1958).
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ment, except the flashlight, was later recovered. The defendant was indicted and tried for armed robbery and
kidnapping. During the trial, when the jury retired, the
defendant was sent back to jail. During its deliberations,
the jury sent a note to the judge asking for assurance that
the death penalty would not be imposed should they return a verdict of guilty. Neither the defendant nor his
counsel were present when the note was received or when
the judge answered assuring the jury that the death penalty
would not be imposed. Later another similar note was
sent by the jury to which the judge's reply was the same.
The defendant was again absent from the court, but the
note was shown to his counsel. A verdict of guilty was
returned.
The questions on appeal included (1) the propriety of
the trial judge's communications to the jury out of the
presence of defendant and his" counsel, and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to show kidnapping, and the correctness of the trial judge's instructions thereon.2 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.
(1) Presence at trial necessary: Responding to the contention that a defendant has a right to be present at all
stages of his trial, the court stated that:
"[A]n accused in a criminal prosecution for a felony
has the absolute right to be present at every stage
of his trial from the time the jury is impaneled until
it reaches a verdict or is discharged, and there can be
no valid trial or judgment unless he has been afforded
that right."3
2The lower court was reversed on the grounds discussed in point (1).
Discussion of point (2) was not necessary to the result, but the court
thought it desirable to express its views for the guidance of the court below on a new trial, utilizing MD. RULE 885 (Scope of Review). For the
same reason it discussed the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction
of robbery, a problem not considered in this note. The defendant's complaints against the attorney who had represented him below were not
considered by the court in view of the result reached on point (1).
9 Midgett v. State, 8upra n. 1, 36. The court held this right to be derived
from the Constitution of Maryland, Declaration of Rights, Art. 5:
"That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common
Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the courses of
that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed
on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and
which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and
other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced
by the Courts of Law and Equity; and also of all Acts of Assembly
in force on the first day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven;
except such as may have been expired, or may be inconsistent with
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It is more specifically pointed out that the defendant has
the right to be present when there is any communication
whatsoever between the court and the jury, unless the
record affirmatively shows that such communication was
not prejudicial or had no tendency to influence the jury.
On this latter point, the court was following the doctrine
of La Guardia v. State,4 which holds that such communication is reversible error unless the record shows that the
communication was not prejudicial. If the appellate court
can not be sure whether in a particular context the remarks of the trial judge in the defendant's absence were
prejudicial or not, there is a tendency to reverse. Such
a situation was involved in Duffy v. State.' There the trial
court repeated its charge to the jury in the defendant's
absence and it was held reversible error. Although the
communication may not have prejudiced the defendant, the
court felt that when dealing with an absolute right,6 the
citizen should not have to suffer speculation as to whether
7
the violation of that right did or did not injure him.
It is generally held that the accused must be present
at his trial for a felony,' and usually should be present if
charged with a misdemeanor, 9 although some jurisdictions
allow trial in the defendant's absence when the punishment
does not include imprisonment."'
the provisions of this Constitution; subject. nevertheless to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State.
*

*

*,9

'190 Md. 450, 458, 58 A. 2d 913 (1948), where the defendant was indicted and tried for rape. While deliberating, the jury sent a question
to the court asking if less than twelve jurors could request leniency from
the court. The court answered in the affirmative, but gave no indication
as to whether it would exercise leniency or not. On appeal the conviction
was upheld since the record affirmatively showed what constituted the communication and the court was satisfied that it had no relation to the verdict, nor did it have any indirect constraining relation to the jury, hence
the defendant was not prejudiced thereby.
5 151 Md. 456, 135 A. 189 (1926).
6 Constitution of Maryland, Declaration of Rights, Art. 5.
'It should be noted that the record in the Duffy case did not set out
the exact words of the communication to the jury, hence the appellate
court would only be speculating as to its prejudicial characteristics, and
it is such speculation that must be eliminated from this area of adjudication.
IAh Fook Chang v. United States, 91 F. 2d 805 (9th Cir. 1937) ; Duffy
v. State, 151 Md. 456, 135 A. 189 (1926).
9 United States v. Shelton, 6 F. 2d 897 (D.C. La. 1925) ; People v. Beck,
305 Ill. 593, 137 N.E. 454 (1922).
10Bardsher v. State, 35 Okl. Cr. 185, 249 P. 437 (1926) (by statute)
Gray v. State, 158 Tenn. 370, 13 S.W. 2d 793 (1929) (obiter). The decision
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On the point that it was prejudicial to the defendant
for the court to promise not to inflict the death penalty
should the jury return a verdict of guilty, the court held
that such a promise is calculated to overcome reasonable
doubts and coerce an agreement for conviction, hence it
is highly prejudicial to the defendant." Most jurisdictions
follow the rule that any communication which tends to
overcome the volition
and independent judgment of the
12
jury is improper.
(2) Kidnapping: The subject case also involves the
first authoritative construction of the rather awkward
Maryland kidnapping statute." In its instruction, the lower
court failed to distinguish between the offenses of kidnapping and false imprisonment. The instruction was to the
effect that the defendant was not required to carry the
victim away from the place where he was seized in order
to constitute kidnapping. This element of carrying away
is, however, the differentiating factor between the two
offenses. At common law, the offense of kidnapping was
the forcible abducting or stealing away of a person and
carrying him out of the country. The offense of false imprisonment, contrarily, did not require that the victim be
removed from the place of seizure. This distinction has
been preserved in the Maryland statute which definitely
requires that the victim be moved from one place to
another, though not necessarily out of the State. Maryland
has, then, by statute adopted the basic common law concept
of the acts which constitute the offense of kidnapping, and
In Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 417 (1914), does not preclude the
possibility that Maryland might make an exception with respect to the
defendant's right to be present, when the defendant is not subject to imprisonment. Here the court held that even though the defendant was only
charged with a misdemeanor he was subject to the death penalty and
therefore he was entitled to the full protection of his constitutional right.
Cf. Wheeler v. State, 42 Md. 563 (1875), where It was held not to be a
denial of the defendant's constitutional right to be present for the court
to receive and answer a note from the jury, with the knowledge of both
the defendant and his counsel, without recalling the jury to the court room.
11McBean v. State, 83 Wis. 206, 53 N.W. 497 (1892).
1123 C.J.S. 1054, Criminal Law, §1380.
'13 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, §337:
"Every person, his counsellors, alders or abettors, who shall be convicted of the crime of kidnapping and forcibly or fraudulently carryIng or causing to be carried out of or within this State any person,
except in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof, with intent to have
such person carried out of or within this State, or with the intent to
have such person concealed within the State or without the State,
shall be guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced to death or to the
penitentiary for not more than thirty years, in the discretion of the
court."
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in addition, has specified that there must be an intent to
carry the victim to another place or, in the alternative, an
intent to conceal the victim either out of or within the
State. Therefore, the lower court's instructions to the jury
were deemed to be unnecessary and improper under the
indictment. 14 In addition, the court felt that the lower
court's reference to an intent to conceal the victim, when
the indictment charged only an intent to carry the victim
away, was misleading, confusing and highly prejudicial
to the defendant. The court stated: ". . an abstract instruction ought not to be given where it is not applicable
to the offense charged in the indictment."' 5 In Wintrobe
v. Hart6 the court distinguished between erroneous and
misleading instructions, holding that the latter type are
never to be considered non-injurious. The reference in
the principal case to the, intent to conceal made by the
lower court served to direct the attention of the jury to
the more aggravated element of the offense of kidnapping
with which the defendant was not charged. 7
BEvERLY

R. WiLLIFoRD

"There may be a question as to whether the lower court's Instruction
regarding this so-called "standstill kidnapping", though unnecessary, was
actually harmful to the defendant in view of the fact that in this case the
victim was carried away from the place of seizure.
Midgett v. State, supra n. 1, 40.
16178 Md. 289, 13 A. 2d 365 (1940).
"The court upheld the lower court's refusal to direct the verdict for
the defendant on the ground that there was evidence before the jury which
would sustain a conviction for armed robbery. Since the communications
between the court and the jury in the defendant's absence were considered an unauthorized interference with the deliberations of the jury on
the robbery question, thereby necessitating a retrial on that question, the
court thought it proper to discuss the intent element of the crime of
robbery for the purpose of guiding the lower court during the retrial;
MD. RuLE 885 (Scope of Review). The court held that robbery required
not only an unlawful taking of another man's property, but also a larcenous
intent to "steal" at the time of the taking. Apparently the court was
referring to the need for an intention to deprive the victim permanently
of his property. The Intent of ,the accused may be ascertained from his
words, acts, and general conduct, both at the time of the taking and sub-

sequent thereto. See 77 C.J.S. 462, Robbery, Sec. 22; WHARTON, CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE (1957), §548. If, when the defendant took the officer's
equipment, he did not intend to steal, but merely to disarm, he Is not
guilty of robbery. See Rex v. Holloway, 5 Car. & P. 524, 172 Eng. Rep.
1082 (1833). The fact that an intent to steal may have formed after the
taking is insufficient, for the requirement is that the act and -the intent
coincide. See Alaniz v. State. 147 Tex. Cr. 1, 177 S.W. 2d 965 (1944). Note
that the weight of the evidence attempting to prove a present intent has
been considered a jury question in Maryland. See Dodson v. State, 213
Md. 13, 130 A. 2d 728 (1957) ; Daniels v. State, 213 Md. 90, 131 A. 2d 267
(1957).

